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Respondent Ada County Highway District ("ACHD) hereby files its brief in the appeal 
of this matter. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of Case And Course Of Proceedings. 
In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant Jack B. Klure, D.D.S. brought a claim for alleged 
business damages under Idaho's eminent domain statutes despite the fact that no taking occurred 
and he had no property interest at the time of the alleged taking. The lower court dismissed 
Klure's claim in response to a summary judgment motion filed by Klure, wherein he 
acknowledged that no issues of fact prevented the court from ruling. The District Court's 
decision is amply supported by the facts, fully complies with Idaho law, and should be affirmed. 
Dr. Klure practiced dentistry with Dr. Thomas Curtis in a two-person partnership doing 
business as Maple Grove Dentistry for just over ten years. Dr. Klure leased space in an office 
building owned by Dr. Curtis near the comer of Maple Grove and Ustick Roads in Boise. 
Dr. Curtis owned both the building and the underlying land, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Dentist Office Property." 
The lease applied only to the Dentist Office Property. Dr. Curtis also owned and had 
partial ownership interests in other parcels of land not covered by the lease near and adjacent to 
the Dentist Office Property. Dr. Klure owned no real property. 
The lease on the Dentist Office Property expired by its own terms on December 31,2006. 
Dr. Klure remained as a holdover tenant on a month-to-month basis for just over three months 
until April 2007. Both the lease and the partnership ended in April of 2007 when Dr. Klure left 
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to practice at another location. Because Dr. Klure is the real party in interest in this appeal, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants will be referred to as "Klure." 
In constructing a project to widen and improve Ustick Road, ACHD sought to acquire a 
13-foot wide strip of property along Ustick Road that was part of a parcel owned by Dr. Curtis. 
Although adjacent to the Dental Office Property, none of the 13-foot wide strip included any part 
of the Dentist Office Property. ARer having the strip of property appraised, ACHD made an 
offer to Dr. Curtis to purchase the property. Dr. Curtis counter-offered with a request that 
ACHD purchase all of the parcels of property he owned at the corner of Ustick and Maple 
Grove. Dr. Curtis and ACHD then successfully negotiated a contract for the sale of the property 
owned by Dr. Curtis at fair market value. Dr. Curtis and ACHD executed the contract on 
June 22,2007. 
When Dr. Curtis and ACHD executed the contract of sale on June 22, 2007, Klure's 
leasehold interest had already expired and terminated. Klure vacated the premises in April of 
2007, ending the partnership and his month-to-month holdover tenancy under the expired lease. 
Despite the plain language of the purchase contract and the circumstances surrounding 
the sale by Dr. Curtis, Klure contends that ACHD condemned the property owned by Dr. Curtis. 
Klure has filed this action to recover business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). Klure first 
filed his claim as a request for declaratory judgment combined with an unnamed cause of action 
for damages. Klure later amended his complaint to frame his claim under 5 7-71 l(2) as a claim 
for inverse condemnation. 
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Klure filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the District Court to rule as a matter 
of law that he is entitled to business damages under 8 7-711(2). The District Court denied his 
motion and later entered judgment in favor of ACHD. Klure now appeals the decision of the 
District Court. 
B. Summary of Argument. 
The District Court did not err, and this appeal should be denied for the following reasons. 
Section 7-71 1(2) does not create a cause of action for business damages outside of a 
condemnation proceeding, whether a direct or inverse condemnation. In the absence of a taking 
and a direct or inverse condemnation proceeding, 5 7-71 1(2) does not apply. 
Klure cannot sustain a claim for inverse condemnation because he had no property 
interest taken by ACHD. His only interest in the property had been a leasehold interest which 
ended no later than the date when Klure voluntarily left the property in April of 2007. The 
leasehold interest was extinguished well before the date of the alleged taking. 
Furthermore, Klure cannot sustain a claim for business damages based on his argument 
that ACHD condemned adjoining property owned by Dr. Curtis. ACHD did not condemn any 
property owned by Dr. Curtis. Rather, Dr. Curtis and ACHD negotiated a contract for the sale 
and purchase of property owned by Dr. Curtis at fair market value. The sale of property by 
Dr. Curtis did not occur under threat of condemnation and was not a taking. The transaction was 
a negotiated, arms-length agreement, freely entered into by both sides at the request of 
Dr. Curtis. 
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Idaho law bars recovery of business damages in condemnation cases if the damages can 
be avoided or mitigated by relocation of the business. It is undisputed that Kiure can and did 
relocate, thus barring his claim. 
Klure cannot recover relocation costs under 3 7-711(2) because he had no property 
interest that was condemned and ACHD did not condemn any adjoining property owned by 
Dr. Curtis. Klure also cannot recover relocation costs under 3 7-71 l(2) because relocation costs 
are governed by a separate statute, Idaho Code 3 40-2001 et seq. This statute sets the 
requirements and procedures for recovery of relocation costs. As found by the District Court, 
Klure did not exhaust his administrative remedies and did not file a petition for judicial review 
upon denial of his request for relocation costs. Klure has conceded in his opening brief that he 
has not appealed the District Court's dismissal of his claim for relocation costs. App. Br. at 3, 
n.2. Therefore, any attempt by Klure to resurrect his claim for relocation costs in this appeal 
should be denied. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. The District Court's Findings of Fact. 
The District Court made detailed findings of fact. See Decision and Order, dated Jan. 26, 
2009, CR at 100-103 and the citations to the record therein.' The following is a summary of the 
District Court's findings of fact. 
' The Clerk's Record in this brief will be abbreviated as CR, and citations to District Court 
decisions, briefing, and affidavits filed in the court below will be to the page numbers within the 
Clerk's Record. 
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Klure and Curtis were equal partners in Maple Grove Dentistry. They practiced at the 
Dentist Office Property under a ten-year lease that expired December 31, 2006. Dr. Curtis was 
the sole owner and lessor of the Dentist Office Property. Klure did not own any property. After 
expiration of the lease, Klure was a month-to-month holdover tenant. Dr. Curtis also owned 
other property near and adjacent to the Dentist Office Property. 
In late 2005, ACHD began planning a project to widen and improve Ustick Road to 
enhance traffic flow, relieve congestion, and improve safety (the "Ustick Project" or "Project"). 
To complete the Project, ACHD needed to acquire a strip of land approximately thirteen feet 
wide running parallel to Ustick road for approximately 1,000 feet. The narrow strip of land 
crossed numerous properties, including parcels owned by Dr. Curtis. However, the narrow strip 
of land did not include any part of the Dentist Office Property, and no part of the Dentist Office 
Property was needed for the Project. The 13-foot wide strip ran between existing Ustick Road 
and the Dentist Office Property, on a different and separate parcel of property owned by 
Dr. Curtis. 
ACHD, as required by law, contacted Dr. Curtis to negotiate a purchase of his property 
needed for the Ustick project. ACHD's established practice is to purchase real property needed 
for its purposes by negotiating in good faith to purchase property at fair market value to avoid 
litigation and the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The law requires ACHD to negotiate 
in good faith to purchase property before it can exercise its power of eminent domain. 
It is undisputed that, had it been necessary to condemn property, the only property ACHD 
would have condemned from Dr. Curtis was the 13-foot wide strip of land. This strip of land 
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was separate and apart from the Dentist Office Property where the dental practice operated. 
No condemnation action was ever necessary or brought. 
ACHD contacted Dr. Curtis in January 2006 to negotiate terms for the purchase of the 
13-foot wide strip of property needed for the Project. In May 2006, Dr. Curtis countered with a 
request that ACHD purchase all of the property he owned, not just the strip of land that ACHD 
needed for the Ustick Project. It is undisputed that ACHD did not need or require the additional 
property which Dr. Curtis wished to sell. By law, ACHD could not have acquired the additional 
property through its power of eminent domain because the additional property was not necessary 
for the Ustick Project. "Necessity" is a mandatory prerequisite and requirement for the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain. See LC. $ 7-704(2). After the request by Dr. Curtis, ACHD 
had the property appraised and offered the fair market value for all of the parcels of property 
owned by Dr. Curtis. Dr. Curtis was represented by counsel in the negotiations. 
Prior to final sale terms being agreed upon, Dr. Curtis entered into a Right-Of-Entry 
Agreement to give ACHD access to the strip of land needed for the Ustick Project. The Right- 
Of-Entry Agreement expressly required ACHD to "prevent disruption of the business operations 
on the Property. . . ." CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at Ex. I, "Right-of-Entry Agreement"). The Right- 
Of-Entry Agreement acknowledged that negotiations for the purchase of all of Dr. Curtis's 
interests in all of the parcels were ongoing. 
On June 22, 2007, Dr. Curtis and ACHD executed the agreement by which ACHD 
purchased all of Dr. Curtis's property interests in the parcels he owned, including the Dentist 
Office Property. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at Ex. J, "Settlement Agreement"). Prior to that date, 
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Klure had decided to terminate his partnership with Dr. Curtis and relocate his practice. He 
relocated his practice in April, 2007. 
Klure has never contended that he owned the real property which had been leased by 
Dr. Curtis to Maple Grove Dentistry. Klure decided to relocate his dental practice because he 
was skeptical about interference of the Ustick Project with access and "ACHD's poor reputation 
for showing no concern for the interests of businesses in the pathway of construction." 
After the lease expired on December 31, 2006, the tenancy converted to a month-to- 
month tenancy unless notice was given to exercise the option to renew as provided for in the 
Agreement. No evidence is in the record that Klure exercised the option to renew. 
2. Additional Relevant Facts. 
The 13-foot wide strip needed for the Project ran through landscaping on the perimeter of 
property owned by Dr. Curtis that was separate and apart from the Dentist Office Property. 
CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 77 32-33 and Ex. D). The size and location of the strip of land was such 
that Klure and Dr. Curtis could have continued to practice dentistry on the Dentist Office 
Property during and aRer the Project. Id. at 7 33 and Ex. D. 
ACHD and Dr. Curtis negotiated and entered into a Right-Of-Entry Agreement on 
November 10,2006, whereby ACHD could enter upon the strip of land necessary for the Project 
so that construction could commence pending an agreement for the purchase of Dr. Curtis's 
property. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 77 42-43 and Ex. I, "Right-of-Entry Agreement"). The Right- 
of-Entry Agreement specifically stated that construction activities were not to cause any 
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disruption or interference with the dental practice of Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure. Id. at 7 45, and 
Ex. I, Section 2. 
No actions by ACHD-either through its negotiations or its construction of the Project- 
interfered with Dr. Curtis's or Dr. Klure's use of the Dentist Office Property or their business 
operations on that property. Dr. Curtis and Klure remained on the property and continued to 
operate their dental practices after ACHD had begun its work on the Project. Id. at 77 62,63,70. 
Their use of the property and their ability to continue their business operations were not impaired 
by the construction of the Project or by ACHD's negotiations for the purchase of property owned 
by Dr. Curtis. Id. 
Dr. Curtis and ACHD entered into the agreement, entitled "Settlement Agreement," for 
the sale and purchase of Dr. Curtis's property to ACHI) on June 22,2007. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. 
at Ex. J, "Settlement Agreement"). Klure had vacated the Dentist Office Property in April of 
2007, ending his partnership with Dr. Curtis and ending his holdover tenancy of the lease on the 
Dentist Office Property that expired December 3 1, 2006. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 7 62). In the 
contract between Dr. Curtis and ACHD, Dr. Curtis represented and warranted that Klure no 
longer had any interest in the property and that the lease agreement had terminated. Id. at 77 59- 
60, and Ex. J, Section H. Wure also signed the agreement, and thereby approved and 
acknowledged the terms and provisions, including the provisions in Section H stating that he no 
longer had any interest in the property and his leasehold interest had terminated. Id. at 7 61, 
Ex. J, Section H. 
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11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. If no taking has occurred, can a business recover business damages under Idaho 
Code 5 7-71 1(2)? 
2. If a business has no interest in real property at the time of an alleged taking, can 
that business recover business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1(2)? 
3. If a business is not in existence at the time of an alleged taking, can that business 
recover business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1(2)? 
111. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 41, ACHD seeks to recover its attorney fees and 
costs as provided under Idaho Code 5 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ACHD is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal because the District Court's ruling was 
based on undisputed facts, and Idaho law is clear on the issues presented. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As held by the District Court, in inverse condemnation cases, the issues of whether there 
has been a taking for which just compensation is required, when the taking occurred, and the 
nature of the property interest taken are issues for the court. Moon v. North Idaho Farmers 
Ass'n, 140 Idaho 536, 542, 96 P.3d 637, 643 (2004); Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 
777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002); Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 
1001, 1004 (1979); Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,892,26 P.3d 1225, 1229 
(Ct. App. 2001). In Idaho, a party cannot sustain a claim for inverse condemnation "unless there 
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has actually been a taking of his or her property." KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 
581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003). 
Because all issues in a condemnation case, other than the amount of any compensation, 
are to be determined by the court, they are proper for resolution on a motion for summary 
judgment. Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39,855 P.2d 876 (1993); Reisenauer v. State, 
120 Idaho 36, 41, 813 P.2d 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1991). In this case, Klure filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the issues and claims presented, thus conceding that no questions of fact 
precluded the District Court from ruling on the issues presented. 
The determination of whether a taking has occurred is a question of law. Therefore, the 
Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over the District Court's decision. KMST at 581, 67 
P.3d at 60. However, the District Court's factual findings in a condemnation case are generally 
not disturbed on appeal. "Although we are free to draw our own conclusions from the facts, we 
will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence." Id. See also Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 P.2d 1333, 1336-37 (1982) (in 
appellate review of district court decisions in inverse condemnation case, the findings of fact of 
the district court will be accepted if they are supported by substantial, competent though 
conflicting evidence, however meager). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 10 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Code 9 7-711(2) Does Not Provide An Independent Cause Of Action For 
Recovery Of Business Damages. A Condemnation Or Taking Must Occur Before 
A Claim Under 5 7-711(2) May Be Brought. 
Klure initially filed his action as a request for declaratory judgment. In short, Klure 
sought to recover business damages under Idaho Code $ 7-71 1 in the absence of a condemnation 
proceeding-either a direct condemnation filed by ACHD or an inverse condemnation by Klure. 
Klure argued that Idaho Code $ 7-71 1 creates its own independent cause of action-separate and 
apart from any eminent domain proceeding. 
Klure's argument is contrary to the plain language of $ 7-71 l(2). To begin with, Idaho 
Code $ 7-71 1 is in the heart of the code provisions governing eminent domain proceedings, and 
is the operative provision governing the assessment of damages in a condemnation case. Section 
7-711(2), wherein the business damage provision is found, begins with the phrase: "lf the 
property sought to be condemned. . . ." LC. $ 7-711(2) (emphasis added). The portion of the 
statute addressing business damages repeatedly refers to the condemnation and taking of 
property. The first prong of the test for whether a business may recover business damages as a 
result of a taking states, in relevant part: "the damages to any business qualifying under this 
subsection having more than five (5) years' standing which the taking of a portion of the 
property and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiffmay 
reasonably cause." Id. (emphasis added). The second prong of the test states that the "business 
must be owned by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining 
lands owned or held by such party." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the language of the statute 
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repeatedly makes clear that the business damages provided under the statute only arise in the 
context of a condemnation. 
Idaho courts have recognized two types of eminent domain proceedings: a direct 
condemnation action initiated by the condemning authority, and an inverse condemnation action 
initiated by a property owner who claims his property has been taken without payment of 
compensation. Sharp, 135 Idaho at 892, 26 P.3d at 1229; Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 39, 813 P.2d 
at 378 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In general, when the state wishes to acquire private property for a public 
use, it will initiate a condemnation proceeding. When the state appropriates property without 
going through the procedure of a condemnation, the property owner may initiate a suit and 
request compensation."). Thus, only two types of eminent domain proceedings exist to recover 
damages for a governmental taking of private property for public purposes. 
ACHD provided extensive briefing on this issue in its Response to Klure's Post-Hearing 
Communication with Court Re: Motion to Dismiss, CR at 16 et seq. (filed Jan. 15, 2008). To 
avoid unnecessary redundancies, ACHD will not repeat that discussion here, but will instead 
summarize those arguments.2 Klure's suggestion that he need only establish two elements to 
recover business damages under Idaho's eminent domain statutes has no merit for the following 
reasons: 
(1) Idaho's business damages statute (Idaho Code 5 7-711(2)) is part of the 
statutory framework for eminent domain proceedings. It only affords damages 
within the context of eminent domain proceedings; 
ACHD incorporates by reference its prior arguments and authority cited in its Response to 
Klure's Post-Hearing Communication with Court Re: Motion to Dismiss, CR 16-30. 
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(2) the plain language of Idaho Code 5 7-711(2) expressly provides that the 
damages are only recoverable in eminent domain proceedings; 
(3) the legislative history of the amendments that added the "business damage" 
provision to Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) makes clear that such damages are only 
available "in eminent domain proceedings;" 
(4) the entire statutory framework for the award of damages under Idaho Code 
Title 7, Chapter 7 clearly contemplates that such damages are recoverable only 
within an eminent domain proceeding; 
(5) the entire body of Idaho eminent domain case law provides for the award of 
damages for a taking of private property within an eminent domain proceeding; 
and 
(6) the single case cited by Klure on this issue, City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 
Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18 (2006), directly contradicts his position. 
In sum, no case law and no statutory authority exists to support a conclusion that a 
business may recover business damages under the eminent domain statute 5 7-711(2) without a 
taking of private property and in the absence of either a direct or an inverse condemnation action. 
Any such contention made or implied in this appeal should be rejected. 
B. Klure Cannot Sustain A Claim For Inverse Condemnation And Cannot Recover 
Business Damages Under 5 7-711(2) Because On The Date Of The Alleged Taking 
He Had No Property Interest And Owned No Business On The Subject Property. 
1. Elements And Burden Of Proving A Claim For Inverse Condemnation. 
The elements required to sustain a claim of inverse condemnation are as follows: 
The action must be: (1) instituted by a property owner who 
(2) asserts that his property, or some interest therein, has been 
invaded or appropriated. (3) to the extent of a taking, (4) but 
without due process of law, and (5) without payment of just 
compensation. 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,780, 53 P.3d 828, 831 (2002); City ofLewiston v. 
Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,856,853 P.2d 596,601 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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In an inverse condemnation, the landowner has the burden of proving the elements of the 
condemnation claim. Specifically, the landowner has the burden of proving that he has a valid 
property right and that his property right has been taken. Rueth, 100 Idaho at 218, 596 P.2d at 
90. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that "[tlhe property owner cannot maintain an 
inverse condemnation action unless there has actually been a taking of his or her property." 
KMST, 138 Idaho at 581, 67 P.3d at 60 (emphasis added). The issues of the nature of the 
property interest alleged to have been taken and whether a taking has occurred are questions of 
law for the trial court. Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 P.3d at 643; Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670, 603 
2. Klure Cannot Meet His Burden of Proving An Inverse Condemnation Claim 
or  a Right to Recover Business Damages. 
In an attempt to satisfy his burden of establishing the existence of a compensable 
property right, Klure points to his leasehold interest in the Dentist Office Property. No part of 
the Dentist Office Property was required for the Project, and no part of the 13-foot wide strip of 
land needed for the Project included any portion of the Dentist Office Property. CR Ex 7 (Price 
Aff. at W 32, 33, 55, 57). Thus, no taking occurred of any property in which Klure had an 
interest. 
Klure's lease of the Dentist Office Property expired on December 31, 2006. After 
expiration of the lease, Klure became a holdover tenant on a month-to-month tenancy basis. 
Klure's holdover tenancy terminated when he voluntarily vacated the property and relocated his 
dental practice to a new location in April, 2007. This terminated his lease and ended his 
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partnership with Dr. Curtis. Klure acknowledged these facts in his Complaint when he stated 
that he voluntarily decided to terminate his partnership with Dr. Curtis and relocate his business. 
Complaint, CR at 7 et seq., 7 11 ("Klure's decision to relocate required that Klure and Curtis 
sever their long-term business relationship at Maple Grove."); see also CR Ex. 6 (Klure Aff. at 
7 7). 
Klure also acknowledged these facts when he signed the purchase agreement between 
Dr. Curtis and ACHD. Dr. Curtis and ACHD executed the agreement for the sale and purchase 
of Dr. Curtis's property on June 22, 2007. The agreement, also signed by Klure, specifically 
affirmed that Klure no longer had any interest in the Dental Office Property and the lease had 
terminated. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 77 58-61, and Ex. J, Section B). Thus, by Klure's own 
admission, he no longer had any interest in the Dental Office Property, voluntarily vacated the 
property, terminated his partnership with Dr. Curtis, and relocated his business-all prior to 
June 22,2007, the date of the alleged taking. 
Since Klure had no interest in the Dental Office Property or in any adjoining property on 
the date of the alleged taking, Klure cannot sustain a claim for inverse condemnation and, under 
the plain language of the statute, Klure cannot recover business damages under Idaho Code 
5 7-711(2). KMST, 138 Idaho at 580-81, 67 P.3d at 59-60; Brown, 124 Idaho at 41, 855 P.2d at 
878 (affirming dismissal of inverse condemnation claim based upon absence of existing, 
compensable property right); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (mining 
company could not recover compensation after giving up leasehold interest). 
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3. Klure's Concerns About Potential Damage to the Dentist Office Property 
Will Not Sustain An Inverse Condemnation Claim. 
In his brief, Klure makes statements regarding the proximity of Ustick Road to the 
Dentist Office Property after the Project. In Idaho, for a property owner to be entitled to 
compensation under Article I, Section 14 of Idaho's Constitution, his property must be "taken" 
and not merely "damaged." Moon, 140 Idaho at 541, 96 P.3d 637 at 642; Covington, 137 Idaho 
at 781, 53 P.3d at 832. It is undisputed that no portion ofthe Dentist Office Property was needed 
for the Project, and Klure does not contend that any taking of the Dentist Office Property 
occurred. No allegation has been made or substantiated that the dental practice could not have 
continued after the Project. In fact, the only evidence is that both Klure and Dr. Curtis continued 
their practices for some months during construction of the Project and while ACHD physically 
occupied the strip of land needed for the Project. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 77 62, 63, 70). No 
allegation has been made and no evidence exists that the Project disrupted business operations on 
the Dentist Office Property. 
4. The District Court Held That Klure Co!rld Nnt Sustain An Inverse 
Condemnation Claim. 
The District Court held that Klure could not sustain an inverse condemnation claim. The 
court based its ruling on the fact that ACHD did not condemn any property; rather Dr. Curtis 
sold the property to ACHD. The court further held that, by law, ACHD could not have 
condemned the Dentist Office Property because it was not needed for the Project. The court 
concluded as follows: 
The right to recover in an inverse condemnation action arises from 
a governmental "taking". If a person with an interest in property 
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loses that interest as a result of a private person's action, their right 
of action is against that private person who deprived them of their 
interest. The right to receive just compensation from the 
government for a taking, requires that the government actually take 
the property. ACHD purchased the property from its owner. The 
reason ACHD acquired the Maple Grove Dentistry building is 
because of the voluntary, arms-length sale of it by the property 
owner, Dr. Curtis. ACHD never sought to utilize the building for 
the Ustick project and it would never have been able to condemn 
the building since the building was not required for the 
construction. 
CR 106-07. The District Court's ruling correctly follows Idaho law, is supported by undisputed 
facts, and should be affirmed. See KMST at 581, 67 P.3d at 60 (appellate court will not disturb 
trial court's findings of fact in inverse condemnation case that are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence); Rueth at 77, 644 P.2d at 336-37 (1982) (appellate court will accept district 
court findings of fact in inverse condemnation cases if supported by substantial, competent 
though conflicting evidence, however meager). 
C. No "Taking" Occurred That Would Entitle Wure To An Award Of Business 
Damages. 
The question of whether a taking has occurred is "a threshold issue that must be 
established before an inverse condemnation action can be maintained." KMST, 138 Idaho at 582, 
67 P.3d at 61; Covington, 137 Idaho at 780, 53 P.3d at 831. 
1. No Taking Occurred Of Any Property In Which Wure Had An Interest. 
Klure's only property interest was a leasehold interest in the Dentist Office Property. No 
part of the Dentist Office Property was needed for the Ustick Project. Therefore, by law, ACHD 
could not have condemned any portion of the Dentist Office Property. See I.C. § 7-704. 
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Because ACHD could not and did not condemn any portion of the Dentist Office Property, 
ACHD did not take or condemn any property interest held by Klure. 
In addition, as shown above, Klure no longer had any interest in the Dentist Office 
Property on the date of the alleged taking on June 22,2007. 
2. No Taking Occurred Of Any Property Adjoining Property In Which Klure 
Once Had An Interest. 
Klure next contends that a taking occurred on June 22, 2007 when ACHD purchased 
adjoining property owned by Dr. Curtis. Klure's argument fails for several reasons. 
a. By Law, ACHD Cannot Exercise Its Power of Eminent Domain Until 
After Negotiating in Good Paith to Purchase the Property. 
Idaho Code 4 7-707 sets forth the legal requirements and prerequisites that must be 
satisfied before any governmental entity may exercise the power of eminent domain. One of the 
key requirements is that the condemnor must first negotiate in good faith to purchase the 
property from the landowner. See I.C. 5 7-707(7). The District Court specifically noted this 
legal requirement: "ACHD, as required by law, contacted Dr. Curtis to work out a purchase of 
his property that was needed for the Ustick project." CR 101. 
By law, ACHD is required to attempt to negotiate for the purchase of property before it 
may exercise any power of eminent domain. If the negotiations are successful, which they were 
in this case, an agreement is reached for the purchase of the property, no taking and no exercise 
of the power of eminent domain occurs, and no property is condemned. No law in Idaho 
supports any contention that the negotiation for the purchase of property is a taking or an 
exercise of the power of eminent domain. 
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b. No Order of Condemnation Was Requested From Or Issued by the 
ACHD Board of Commissioners. 
The law also requires that, before the power of eminent domain may be exercised, the 
governing body of the governmental entity must pass a Condemnation Resolution or an Order of 
Condemnation, authorizing the use of the power of eminent domain. See LC. $7-707(6). In the 
absence of an Order of Condemnation from its governing board, ACHD has no authority to 
exercise the power of eminent domain. 
In this case, it is undisputed that ACHD's Commissioners were never asked to issue and 
never issued an Order of Condemnation as to any property owned by Dr. Curtis. CR Ex. 7 (Price 
Aff. at 7 68). Therefore ACHD did not have the authority to condemn or initiate a condemnation 
of any property owned by Dr. Curtis. Absent that authority, no condemnation could have 
occurred. 
c. No Taking Occurred as a Result of ACHD's Purchase of Property 
From Dr. Curtis. 
The agreement between ACHD and Dr. Curtis was a negotiated, arms-length transaction 
for the purchase of the Dentist Office Property and did not amount to a taking. See City of 
Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 858, 853 P.2d 596, 603 (Ct. App. 1993). ACHD never 
sought or obtained an Order of Condemnation from its Board of Commissioners, and never filed 
or pursued a condemnation action. 
In City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that no taking occurs as a 
result of planning for construction of road project or from negotiating with property owners for 
the purchase of their property. Id. at 858, 853 P.2d at 603. Consistent with the Court's decision 
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in Lindsey, numerous other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that negotiations by a 
governmental entity to purchase property or planning for the acquisition of property do not 
amount to a taking: 
Stahelin v. Forest Presewe Dist. of Du Page County, 877 N.E.2d 1121, 1131 (Ill. 
2007) ("'the 'taking of land by eminent domain' is not accomplished by passing 
resolutions or ordinances or by negotiating with the owners for the purchase of it 
or by serving notice to the owner that land may be required for public purposes.") 
(quoting Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 36 N.E.2d 245, 248 
(Ill. 194 1)) (emphasis added); 
Ferrari v. United States, 73 Fed. C1. 219, 225 (2006) (negotiations between the 
government and a landowner, including a failed negotiation "is not enough to 
constitute a taking) (emphasis added); 
* B. W. Parkway Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 29 Fed. C1. 669, 680 (1993) 
a r d ,  36 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[glood faith negotiations to puichase 
property do not constitute a taking.") (citation omitted). 
Additionally, since ACHD is required to negotiate in good faith with a landowner to 
purchase property, it cannot initiate or successfully maintain a condemnation action until it 
satisfies this requirement. LC. 8 7-707(7); CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at f 69). Because the 
negotiation for the purchase of property from Dr. Curtis was successful, no condemnation action 
was ever initiated at either the agency level or by any judicial proceeding. All discussions and 
negotiations with Dr. Curtis were for thepurchase of his property and had nothing to do with an 
exercise of ACHD's power of eminent domain. 
Accordingly, no taking by ACHD occurred in this matter, and Klure's claim of inverse 
condemnation fails. 
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d. The District Court Likewise Held That No Taking Occurred When 
ACHD Purchased Property From Dr. Curtis. 
The District Court held that, by law, ACHD could only have condemned the 13-foot wide 
strip of property needed for the Project. CR at 105. That strip did not include any part of the 
Dentist Office Property. The court found that, when approached by ACHD to purchase this strip 
of property, Dr. Curtis countered with his own proposal that ACHD buy his interests in each of 
the parcels he owned. CR at 104. The court then ruled that the sale of the property was not a 
taking: 
When the agreement closed on June 22, 2007, Klure had already 
relocated his practice and the lease had been terminated. Under the 
circumstances of this case, there was no "taking" since the sale was 
an arms-length transaction of the sale of all of Dr. Curtis' property. 
Klure had no interest in the property. 
The sale of the building came as a result of the owner's counter- 
offer, not as a result of condemnation proceedings by ACHD . . . 
The loss of the building came through the sale by the property 
owner, not governmental action. The threat of possible 
condemnation in the future from ACHD's original proposal to 
purchase the strip of land needed for the Ustick project does not 
constitute a taking. City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 
853 P. 2d 596 (Ct. App. 1993). In this case, condemnation 
proceedings were never brought and a voluntary sale of the 
property was accomplished after the lease was terminated. 
CR at 104-05. The District Court's ruling correctly applies the law to the undisputed facts in this 
case and is properly affirmed. 
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e. ACHD Did Not Affirmatively Exercise Its Powers of Eminent Domain 
to "Take" the Subject Property So As to Trigger the Condemnation 
Clause of Klure's Lease Agreement. 
The triggering events for the condemnation clause of the Curtis-Klure lease never 
occurred, and Klure cannot recover against ACHD under the lease. The condemnation clause in 
the Lease Agreement provides that: 
14.1 Entire or Substantial Taking If the entire Premises or so 
much thereof as to make the balance not reasonably adequate for 
the conduct of Tenant's business notwithstanding restoration by 
Landlord hereinafier provided, shall be taken under the power of 
eminent domain, this Lease shall automatically terminate as of the 
date on which condemning authority takes title or possession, 
whichever first occurs. 
CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at Ex. G, 7 14.1) (emphasis added). The condemnation clause addresses 
what happens between Dr. Curtis and Klure in the event of a taking of the Dentist Office 
Property by power of eminent domain. Id. By law, ACHD did not and could not exercise its 
power of eminent domain to acquire the Dentist Office Property because it was not needed for 
the Ustick Project. Thus, no taking by eminent domain occurred. Absent a "taking" of the 
Dentist Office Property, the condemnation clause is not triggered and does not support Klure's 
claim for business damages against ACHD. 
Klure's lease expired on December 3 1, 2006. His holdover tenancy terminated when he 
voluntarily vacated the Dentist Office Property in April of 2007. Even if ACHD's purchase of 
Dr. Curtis's property could be considered a taking, that taking did not occur until June 22,2007, 
after Klure's lease had already terminated. Therefore, the lease provision is irrelevant and does 
not apply. 
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D. No "Sale Under Threat Of Condemnation" Occurred That Amounted To A Taking. 
Klure argues that the sale of Dr. Curtis's property to ACHD was made under threat of 
condemnation. However, Klure made no argument nor did he present any evidence that there 
was ever any threat of condemnation during the negotiations between ACHD and Dr. Curtis. 
Therefore, Klure has failed to meet his burden on this issue. Accordingly, the District Court 
rnled as follows: 
While the Lease Agreement treats the sale of the premises "under 
threat of condemnation or while condemnation proceedings are 
pending" as a "taking," there was never a threat of condemnation 
for the building used by Maple Grove Dentistry nor were any 
condemnation proceedings pending. Affidavit of Steven B. Price, 
Affidavit of Jack D. Klure, D.D.S.. Exh. 1. Dr. Curtis sold the 
property aRer the lease was terminated and after Klure had 
relocated his practice. As ACHD has pointed out, because it did 
not need the portion of the property on which the building for 
Maple Grove Dentistry was located, it could not have used its 
power of eminent domain to acquire it. 
CR at 105. 
In addition to having failed to satisfy his burden, Klure's argument fails on the merits 
because ACHD's negotiations for the purchase of the Dentist Office Property were not made 
under "threat of condemnation." No such threat was ever made during any discussions or 
negotiations with ACHD. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 7 65). Additionally, no "threat of 
condemnation" could be made because ACHD can only condemn property if it is needed for a 
public project (LC. 5 7-704(2)), and only if ACHD has obtained an Order of Condemnation from 
its Commissioners. LC. 3 7-707(6). ACHD's Commissioners never issued any Order of 
Condemnation for the strip of property needed for the Project. CR Ex. 7 (Price Aff. at 77 67-68). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 23 
In addition, by law, ACHD could not threaten to condemn property it did not need and did not 
have authority to condemn. 
1. The Case Law from Outside Idaho Cited by Klure Provides No Support for 
His Position. 
Klure "concedes that no taking took place with regard to any of the purchased property 
that was not actually used in connection with the Project." App. Br. at 12. Thus, Klure's 
argument that a taking occurred is limited to the 13-foot wide strip of land "along Ustick Road 
that was actually used for the Project." Id. 
To support his argument that the sale of the 13-foot wide strip of land owned by 
Dr. Curtis occurred under threat of condemnation, Klure relies on P.C. Management, Inc. v. 
Page Two, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 434,437 (Ind. App. 1991). This reliance is misplaced. Klure seizes 
on a statement by the Indiana Court of Appeals that it was "persuaded by out-of-state authority 
that a conveyance in lieu of actual condemnation of real property constitutes a condemnation 
proceeding because it indicates an intention to acquire the property by condemnation and is 
tantamount to a taking under the power of eminent domain." Id. at 437. However, this statement 
is taken out of context from the remainder of the case, where the court in fact held that the state 
condemnation statute did "not apply to the facts of this case" because "[ulnder the express terms 
of the sublease" the plaintiffs rights and interest in the property had already terminated. Id. at 
439. 
The court noted that the plaintiff "had no property interest which was taken by the City." 
Id. The court concluded that "under the circumstances of this case the City had no obligation to 
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purchase the plaintiff's sublease interest because any interest "had terminated already by 
operation of law." Id. (emphasis added). 
As in P.C. Management, Klure's lease of the Dentist Office Property had already 
terminated before ACHD purchased the property. Because Klure had no interest, no interest was 
either taken or sold. Furthermore, it is undisputed that no part of the Dentist Office Property was 
required for the Project and the Project did not encroach upon or otherwise physically touch any 
portion of that property. See also App. Br. at 17 (conceding that "the Project did not include the 
actual building occupied by Maple Grove [Dentistry]")). 
Klure's reliance on Fuddy Duddy 's v. State Dept, of Transp., 950 P.2d 773 (Nev. 1997), 
is also misplaced. In Fuddy Duddy 's, the owners of a parcel of property leased the property to a 
third party. Id, at 774. The lease contained a clause terminating the lease upon any 
condemnation action. Id. Several years later, the Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) 
sought to expand the roadway adjacent to the parcel and expressly adopted a "Condemnation 
Resolution" authorizing and directing NDOT to acquire the property as necessary for the road 
project. Id. The owners notified the plaintiff-leaseholder of the condemnation resolution and the 
fact that the lease had terminated pursuant to the condemnation clause. The owners then entered 
into a voluntary purchase agreement with NDOT. Id. 
The plaintiff-leaseholder filed a lawsuit against NDOT and the owners seeking an award 
of damages because it argued that NDOT's purchase of the owners' property did not trigger the 
condemnation clause in his lease because NDOT did not comply with the state's condemnation 
statute. Id. at 774-75 (emphasis added). In response, NDOT argued that it purchased the 
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property "under the threat of condemnation" and was "the equivalent of a condemnation." Id. at 
775. The court agreed with NDOT and held "that a purchase made under the threat of 
condemnation is the same as a judicial condemnation" and that the lease termination language 
was appropriately triggered. Id. 
Fuddy Duddy's offers no support for Klure's position in this case. Here, "[ilt is not 
contradicted that ACHD did not need or require the additionalproperty which Dr. Curtis wished 
to sell." CR at 101-102 (emphasis added). It is also undisputed that the ACHD Commission 
never passed any condemnation resolution, as had the NDOT in Fuddy Duddy 's. Moreover, 
even if ACHD had wanted to, it "could not have acquired the additional property through its 
eminent domain powers because the additional property" was not necessary for the Project. CR 
at 102 (District Court Decision and Order) (emphasis added). 
Klure also cites Lanning v. City of Monterey, 226 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986), for the proposition that the "sale of property to the city was the essential equivalent of its 
exercise of eminent domain power." App. Br. at 13. However, Lanning is distinguishable 
because the court in that case based its holding on the "evidence that the City and the railroad 
expressly agreed in their sales agreement" that the sale was equivalent to a condemnation. 226 
Cal. Rptr. at 262. The court also relied on testimony by the seller that in fact the "land was not 
for sale" and "was really taken away from us: we did not want to sell it." Id. No similar 
language is found in the agreement between Dr. Curtis and ACHD and no such testimony exists 
in this case. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that the idea of purchasing all of 
Dr. Curtis's property was proposed by Dr. Curtis. 
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The Lanning Court further held as follows: 
The mere fact that respondent has the power of eminent domain, 
when in fact such power is neither exercised nor remotely 
threatened, is insufficient to render it liable in an inverse 
condemnation action every time it deals in an open market 
transaction which results in leases or licenses being broken. The 
'power to condemn' cannot in and of itself constitute proximate 
cause where there is an intervening force or factor. In an open 
market transaction the 'power to condemn' is not enough - there 
must be evidence of implied or actual threat of condemnation, so 
that the ultimate result is a foregone conclusion. 
Lanning v. City of Monterey, 226 Cal. Rptr. 258, 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Paczpc 
Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Burbank, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) 
(emphasis added)). 
Klure argues that because the property was not available on the "open market," the sale is 
somehow transformed into a condemnation. This argument is negated by the fact that ACHD 
had the property appraised and purchased it at fair market value. CR at 102. See also Lanning v. 
City of Monterey, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (citing Pacijic Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of 
Burbank. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08 (classifying an "open market transaction" as a business 
contract in which the "City had never threatened to institute condemnation proceedings to 
acquire the property.")). 
Klure next cites Vincent v. Redev. Auth., Etc., 487 A.2d 1024, 1025 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1985). Vincent is readily distinguishable. In Vincent, the court gave great weight to the fact that 
"theparties themselves have stipulated that the deed entered into between the [the parties] was in 
lieu of this intended condemnation." Id. (emphasis added). Also, as in Fuddy Duddy 's, the 
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Vincent Court noted that the governmental authority "passed a resolution indicating its intention 
to acquire the subject property by condemnation." Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that these 
"events" in their totality constituted a condemnation. Id. 
Here, ACHD and Dr. Curtis never stipulated that the purchase agreement amounted to a 
condemnation. ACHD never threatened to institute condemnation proceedings to acquire the 
Dentist Office Property and could not have done so by law. The ACHD Board of 
Commissioners never passed an Order of Condemnation or similar resolution. Because the 
Curtis-Klure Lease Agreement was terminated before ACHD entered the purchase agreement 
with Dr. Curtis, any interest that Klure previously had was already gone. Thus, Klure could not 
recover business damages even if the purchase of property by ACHD were considered to be a 
taking or condemnation. 
Lastly, Klure cites Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. 839 So.2d 727 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2003), in support of his contention that the subdivision covenants gave him a right of 
use of common areas that was compensable. In Winn-Dixie, the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) condemned a portion of a shopping center, including a large amount of the shopping 
center's parking spaces. Id. at 728. Winn-Dixie leased commercial space in the shopping center. 
Id. Winn-Dixie brought an action against DOT and the shopping center owner to recover a share 
of the condemnation proceeds because it had a leasehold interest in the parking area. Id. at 729. 
The Florida Court of Appeals concluded that Winn-Dixie was entitled to a share of the 
condemnation proceeds, as well as severance and business damages. Id. The court reasoned that 
"[tlhe lease, taken as a whole, contemplate[d] a leasehold interest in the common areas of the 
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shopping center," evidenced by a monthly fee for "general repair and maintenance of all paved 
surfaces." Id. at 730. Thus, the lease demonstrated that Winn-Dixie had in fact "bargained for 
an interest in the parking area of the shopping center" and was entitled to compensation. Id. 
Winn-Dixie has no bearing on this case because Winn-Dixie involved an actual 
condemnation and taking, whereas this case involves a purchase. Also, in Winn-Dixie the lease 
was still in place and ongoing. Here, the Curtis-Klure partnership had ended and the lease had 
terminated before ACHD purchased the property from Dr. Curtis. Furthermore, the lease in 
Winn-Dixie encompassed the parking lot, whereas Klure concedes that "the Maple Grove Lease 
does not explicitly refer to the parking area." App. Br. at 19. Nevertheless, Klure attempts to 
argue that the by-laws of the Fairbank Subdivision association somehow "entitled" him to "an 
easement for parking and access." App. Br. at 17. 
Specifically, Klure cites the Code of By-Laws of Maple Grove Professional Owners 
Association, Inc. which provided that Lot 16 was "reserved for open area.. .driveways and 
parking areas" and that all owners of Fairbanks Subdivision, including Lot 19 (the Dentist Office 
Property) had a "permanent nonexclusive easement for the use of the Office Building Common 
Area." App. Br. at 17-18. Accordingly, Klure asserts that, like the tenant in Winn-Dixie, he is 
entitled to a portion of the "taking" proceeds because he had an interest in the parking area. 
Winn-Dixie is distinguishable on this point as well. Specifically, the Winn-Dixie Court 
placed great significance on the fact that Winn-Dixie paid a periodic monthly payment for 
maintenance of the parking area and the lease provided a corresponding interest in the parking 
lot. 839 So.2d at 730. Here, Klure did not "bargain for" an interest in the parking area, he did 
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not pay monthly fees for its upkeep, and the lease did not encompass or refer to any parking 
areas. Rather, Klure enjoyed a gratuitous benefit to his business operations on the Dentist Office 
Property. 
Even assuming arguendo that the interest in the parking area amounted to a "bargained 
for" interest, unlike the unexpired lease at issue in Winn-Dixie, Klure is not entitled to 
compensation or business damages because he no longer had a leasehold interest in any property 
at the time of the alleged taking. Rather, the lease had expired, then had terminated, and the 
partnership had dissolved before the alleged taking. CR at 102 (noting that the Curtis-Klure 
partnership dissolved in the late Winter of 2006 or early Spring of 2007; that Klure relocated his 
practice in April 2007; and that Dr. Curtis and ACHD entered a purchase agreement on June 22, 
2007). 
2. Case Law on Point Makes Clear that No Taking Occurred. 
When a governmental entity purchases property by contract, it does not condemn the 
property. In such circumstances, it acts merely as a purchaser without an exercise of sovereign 
powers. See City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho at 858, 853 P.2d at 603 (no condemnation 
occurs as a result of planning for construction of a road project or negotiating with landowners 
for the purchase of their property). 
In General Sewices Comm'n. v. Little-Tex Insulation, Co. 39 S.W.3d 591, 599 (Tex. 
2001), the Supreme Court of Texas held as follows: 
[The] State wears two hats: the State as a party to the contract and 
the State as sovereign. The State, in acting within a color of right 
to take or withhold property in a contractual situation, is acting 
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akin to a private citizen and not under any sovereign powers. In 
this situation, the State does not have the intent to take under its 
eminent domain powers; the State only has an intent to act within 
the scope of the contract. 
Little Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 599 (rejecting inverse condemnation by general contractor against state 
university where university exercised only its contractual powers, not eminent domain, and "only 
ha[d] an intent to act within the scope of the contract."). 
In State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. 2007), the Texas Supreme Court held that a 
third party patent holder did not have a viable condemnation claim against the State because the 
State was "acting under color of contract" and was not "invoking its eminent-domain powers" 
when it entered into a contract with two private companies for the design, construction and use 
of three water storage facilities. Id. at 641-43. The court concluded that because the contract 
reflected only the State's intent to exercise its contractual rights and it lacked the "requisite intent 
to take. . . under its eminent-domain powers, the State is not subject to [inverse condemnation] 
liability." Id. at 644. 
Here, ACHD acted with its "power to contract" in purchasing Dr. Curtis's property. 
ACHD only needed the 13-foot wide strip that ran along side of Ustick Road, and it was 
Dr. Curtis who approached ACHD in May 2006 to negotiate a sale of all of his property. CR at 
100-02. ACHD acted only in the exercise of contractual rights-which it is statutorily 
empowered to do. See I.C. 9 40-1309. ACHD was not invoking its eminent domain powers 
when it entered into the contract for sale with Dr. Curtis. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 31 
ACHD's mere adoption and plan for the Ustick project, which includes the power to 
condemn, falls "several leagues short of a firm declaration" of ACHD's intent to condemn 
Dr. Curtis's property. Langer v. Redevelopment Agency, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 21, 26 (Cal. App. 
Ct. 1999). "The fact that a leasehold interest is a property interest which may be condemned 
does not mean . . . as a matter of law that a de facto taking has occurred." Millcreek Township v. 
N.E.A. Cross Co., 620 A.2d 558, 562 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (emphasis added). "Stated 
differently, acquiring property under a threat of condemnation is not the same as acquiring 
property under an actual eminent domain proceeding." Knop v. Gardner Sch. Dist., 205 P.3d 
755, 766 &an. 2009) (holding there was no compensable inverse condemnation claim because 
there was no "taking" in the absence of a final condemnation judgment entered and where 
evidence showed the school voluntarily "purchased the plaintiffs' land under written contract" 
separate and apart from eminent domain statutes). It "suffices to say that a threat of 
condemnation is not a taking." Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 572, 
573 (Fed. Ct. C1. 1951) (citing United States v. Sponenbarger, 208 U.S. 256, 267 (1939); 
Danforth v. Unitedstates, 308 U.S. 271, 283-286 (1939)). 
In Paczjk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Burbank, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906, 911 (Cal. 
App. Ct. 1978), the court found that a city's acquisition of property from a railroad was an open 
market transaction, and that any leases or licenses that were terminated because of the 
transaction would not support a claim of inverse condemnation. Id. Pacific Outdoor Advertising 
had a licensing agreement with the railroad to erect and maintain several billboards on the 
railroad's right-of-way. Id. at 908. Nevertheless, the city and the railroad entered into a lease 
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agreement for property owned by the railroad including the right-of-way where Pacific's signs 
were located. Id. The lease agreement included a provision that the railroad could terminate the 
agreements with Pacific, and the railroad terminated Pacific's licenses. Id. 
Pacific sought damages in inverse condemnation against the city, on the basis that the 
city had essentially "caused" the railroad to terminate Pacific's licenses. Id. In particular, 
Pacific argued that even though the city had not exercised its condemnation authority, the fact 
that it could have condemned the property in question was sufficient to support an action in 
inverse condemnation. Id, 
The California Court of Appeals rejected Pacific's argument. Id. Instead, the court 
found that the railroad and the city had engaged in an open market transaction and that "the 
power to condemn is not enough, there must be evidence of implied or actual threat of 
condemnation, so that the ultimate result is a foregone conclusion." Id. at 91 1. The Pacific 
Court emphasized that the "power to condemn" itself is not the proximate cause giving rise to 
inverse condemnation liability where there is an intervening force or factor. Id. at 91 1-12. The 
court concluded that the license with Pacific had been properly terminated and the city and 
railroad had acted freely in their own financial interests to terminate the license. Id. This 
voluntary act between the parties constituted an intervening force or factor that severed any 
casual link between the "power to condemn" and the termination of the plaintiffs license. Id. at 
911. Thus, "absent an unequivocal act or intent to condemn if necessary,[] the 'power to 
condemn,' does not in and of itself constitute proximate cause." Id. 
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In Langer v. Redevelopment Agency, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19 (Cal. App. Ct. 1999), the 
California Court of Appeals rejected an inverse condemnation action brought by two commercial 
tenants against a state redevelopment agency where the underlying owner had given the tenants 
notice of his intent to sell the property to the agency and had voluntarily entered an agreement to 
sell his property "fi-ee and clear" of those interests. Id. at 21, 24. The plaintiffs argued that 
although the agency did not resort to its condemnation powers, the seller had entered into the 
sale agreement under threat of condemnation that amounted to a taking. Id. at 20-21. 
The court held that to "have inverse condemnation, you have to have a taking or at the 
very least a definite and unequivocal manifestation that the public entity in question was ready to 
use its power to condemn, and in fact would clearly do so if necessary, to acquire the property at 
issue." Langer, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). The 
court held that there was no evidence that the "Agency was prepared to use its power to 
condemn" the land at issue or that the landowner "was acting under the threat of condemnation 
when he gave his tenants notice." Id. Rather, the agreement between the parties was an open 
market transaction where the owner voluntarily entered into a sale with the redevelopment joint- 
venture. Id. 
The Langer Court reaffirmed the principle outlined in Pacific over twenty years earlier, 
namely that "[tlhe power to condemn, in and of itself, does not constitute proximate cause where 
there are intervening factors." Langer, 84 Cal. Rpt. 2d at 25-26. The court explained that "the 
owner of the properties terminated the tenancies on his properties" under voluntary agreement, 
which by its terms included his promise to "deliver his properties free of tenancies." Id. 
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Accordingly, the court concluded that this voluntary act constituted "an intervening force or 
factor sufficient to negate inverse condemnation liability on the part of the Agency." Id. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
Additionally, the court held that "the fact that the Agency had the authority to condemn 
property in the redevelopment area and indeed used its condemning authority to acquire other 
parcels in the Gateway Project" did "not give rise to a triable issue regarding the Agency's 
eminent domain liability" as to the specific parcels at issue. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). The 
court explained that the mere adoption of a redevelopment plan or project which includes the 
power to condemn falls "several leagues short of a firm declaration of an intention to condemn 
real property." Id. (citation omitted). 
Here, ACHD approached Curtis in January 2006 to negotiate the purchase of the 13-foot 
wide strip needed for the Ustick Project. CR at 101. No condemnation proceedings were ever 
threatened or initiated. CR at 101. Curtis approached ACHD in May 2006 and made a counter- 
proposal for the sale of all of his property. CR at 101. 
By its own terms, the lease held by the CurtisKlure partnership expired on December 31, 
2006. CR at 102. On June 22, 2007, after the CurtisIKlure lease had expired and Klure bad 
relocated his practice, Curtis entered into a voluntary agreement with ACHD for the sale of all of 
his property at fair market value. CR at 102. No condemnation of any property was threatened 
and no condemnation occurred. Accordingly, Klure cannot recover business damages under 
§ 7-71 l(2) because no taking occurred. 
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3. KIure3s Reliance on a Statement in Nichols Is Misplaced. 
Klure cites to 7 Nichols on Eminent Domain 5 G6.02[1] for the proposition that 
"[plroperty acquired amicably in lieu of condemnation is treated as though it were taken through 
an eminent domain proceeding, entitling the affected party to relocation benefits." The Nichol's 
treatise cites only one case in support of this proposition: Redevelopment Auth. v. Pvopevty 
Located In West Milton, 517 A.2d 210 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986). However, this case does not 
support the statement in Nichols. 
In West Milton, the lessee brought an action against the redevelopment authority alleging 
a de facto taking after the landowners had entered into a settlement agreement in lieu of 
condemnation and notified that lessee that by its agreement, it was terminating the lease. West 
Milton, 517 A.2d at 21 1. The court explained that "[tlo be entitled to compensation for a taking, 
one must be the owner of a property interest taken." Id. The court affirmed the trial court's 
finding that the lessee had no valid condemnation claim because "[alt the time of actual purchase 
by deed" the lessee "had no compensable property interest in the lease" because the lease had 
expired, the lessee had waived its right to renewal, and had "agreed to an early termination of the 
lease." Id. at 211-12. The court concluded that under the facts of the case the "tenant whose 
lease has expired [wals not a condemnee under the Code." Id. In dicta, the court noted that 
"even if [the lessee] did have a right of annual renewal" because it had neither been waived nor 
expired, the agency's actions would still have "been insufficient to establish a de facto taking" 
because "mere negotiations and even appraisals and a flood control plan were insufficient to 
establish a de facto taking." Id. 
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In short, West Milton provides no support for the statement in Nichols cited by Klure or 
Klure's position in this case. In addition, other Pennsylvania case law further refutes Klure's 
contention. In Koschak v. Redevelopment Auth., 758 A.2d 291 p a .  Comrnw. Ct. 2000), a 
podiatrist (lessor) owned real property and shared office space with a second podiatrist (lessee) 
pursuant to "office sharing and right of first refusal agreement." Id. at 292. Under the terms of 
the agreement, the lessor/podiatrist had the authority to terminate the agreement if he elected to 
sell the property. Id. After the lessor notified the lessee that he had decided to sell the property 
to the redevelopment authority, the lessee brought an action alleging that he was entitled to 
condemnation damages. Id. at 292-93. 
On appeal, the court concluded that the lessee's argument of a de facto taking in lieu of 
condemnation was barred on procedural grounds. Id. at 293-94 & n.2. Nevertheless, the court 
explained that "[wlere the argument lo be considered, it would fail" because the mere negotiation 
for sale did not amount to "closing" under the terms of the lease---the date before which the 
lessor had to declare the rights of the lessee to be terminated. Id. Because the lessor gave notice 
of his intent to terminate the lease-in this instance a mere day's notice-the court found that the 
lessee no longer had any legal right to occupy the premises on the date of the sale. Id. 
Accordingly, the lessee had no compensable interest-under either a theory of de facto 
condemnation or statute-because the authority's "purchase of the subject property was through 
private negotiations and sale rather than through its powers" of eminent domain. Id. See also 
Carr v. City of Pittsburg, 837 A.2d 655, 661 (Pa. Coimnw. Ct. 2003) (applying Koschak and 
finding no compensable interest where sale was "arms-length transaction" and "acquiring agency 
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acquired the property through private negotiations rather than through its power" of 
condemnation). 
Here, Klure no longer had a compensable interest in any property. His lease expired 
December 31, 2006. CR at 102. He vacated the premises in April of 2007. CR at 102. On 
June 22, 2007, after the lease had terminated and Klure had relocated his practice, Dr. Curtis 
entered into a voluntay agreement with ACHD for the sale of his property at fair market value. 
CR at 102. 
No condemnation proceedings were ever threatened or initiated. CR at 101. No de facto 
condemnation occurred because negotiations pursuant to a planned government project are 
insufficient to establish a de facto taking where the evidence clearly shows the sale was the 
product of an arms-length transaction rather than ACHD's condemning authority. See West 
Milton, 517 A.2d at 212. 
E. Klure Cannot Recover Business Damages Under $7-711(2) Because His Business 
Can And Has Been Relocated. 
Even if the Court were to find that Klure did in fact have a compensable property interest 
and that a taking occurred, Klure is still barred from recovering business damages. Section 
7-71 l(2) only permits an award of business damages if the losses cannot be reasonably prevented 
by the relocation of the business. It is undisputed that Klure has relocated his business and 
thereby prevented any business losses that might have occurred as the result of ACHD's actions. 
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The District Court correctly held that "[b]usiness damages are not awarded if the loss can 
be reasonably prevented by the relocation of the business nor can they be awarded for temporary 
interruptions due to construction." CR at 107. The court fixther held that 
Klure relocated his practice because of his fear of disruption during 
construction which is not a compensahle harm . . . Klure's concern 
outlined in his Affidavit was not that the project as originally 
proposed would damage Maple Grove Dentistry but rather the 
construction of the entire project would cause disruption to the 
business. Temporary business interruption due to construction is 
not compensable under I.C. 5 7-711(2). There is no right to any 
business damages under LC. 5 7-71 l(2). 
Because Klure can and did relocate his dental practice, he cannot recover business 
damages under 5 7-71 l(2). This conclusion is stated in the plain language of the statute. The 
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Klure relocated not because the practice of dentistry could 
not continue at that location, but only because he was concerned about temporary disruption 
during the construction phase of the Project. Therefore, Klure is not entitled to any award of 
business damages under 5 7-7 1 l(2). 
F. Klure Cannot Recover Relocation Costs Under 9 7-711(2) Because Relocation Costs 
Are Governed By Idaho Code 5 40-2001 et seq. Klure Failed To Exhaust His 
Administrative Remedies, Failed to Seek Judicial Review, And Has Not Appealed 
Dismissal Of His Claim For Relocation Costs. 
Klure cites City of McCall v. Seubevt, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18 (2006) for the 
proposition that relocation costs can be recovered under 5 7-71 l(2). Under the express language 
of 3 7-711(2), business damages cannot be recovered if the damages can be mitigated by 
relocation. However, relocation costs can be recovered by statute. See Idaho Highway 
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Relocation Assistance Act, LC. 5 40-2001, et seq. Idaho's statute also provides for relocation 
benefits under the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions 
Policies Act of 1970. See LC. 5 40-2012; 42 U.S.C. 9 4601, et seq.; and 49 C.F.R. Part 24. 
In this case, Klure applied for and was denied relocation costs by ACHD because ACHD 
did not take or condemn any property and because Klure had no interest in the property to be 
acquired for the Project. When Klure sought to recover relocation costs in this case, the District 
Court found that Klure had not pursued or exhausted his administrative remedies. CR at 37. The 
District Court further found that Klure had not brought his claim as a request for judicial review, 
as mandated by statute. CR at 37-38. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the claim. CR 
at 37-38. Klure has not appealed the dismissal of his claim for relocation costs, as acknowledged 
in his brief. App. Br. at 3, n.2. 
Because Klure is barred by law from recovering business damages, and because he did 
not properly pursue or appeal his claim for relocation costs, Klure's claim for recovery of 
relocation costs should be denied on appeal. 
G. Klure Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees. 
Klure argues that if the case is remanded he is entitled to recover his attorney fees under 
Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.3d 1067 (1983). Based on 
Acarrequi, Klure contends that he is entitled to fees "if the condemnor does not reasonably make 
a timely offer of settlement of at least ninety percent of the ultimate jury verdict." App. Br. at 
21. The Court in Acarrequi did not define what it meant by a "timely offer." However, it 
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concluded that an offer made on the courthouse steps an hour before trial is not timely. Id. at 
878,673 P.2d at 1072. 
Subsequent Idaho Supreme Court cases have given additional direction as to what 
constitutes a "timely offer," most notably State of Idaho v. Jardine, 130 Idaho 318, 940 P.2d 
1137 (1997). In Jardine, the Court approved the district court's refusal to consider settlement 
offers made within less than 90 days prior to trial. Id. at 322, 940 P.2d at 1141. 
In this case, ACHD is clearly entitled to a judicial determination of whether a taking 
occurred as a matter of law and whether Klure has the legal right to recover business damages 
before being required to make a settlement offer of within 90% of what a jury might ultimately 
award. The question of whether a taking has occurred is "a threshold issue that must be 
established before an inverse condemnation action can he maintained." KMST, 138 Idaho at 582, 
67 P.3d at 61; Covington, 137 Idaho at 780,53 P.3d at 831. 
Absent these legal rulings, ACHD could be forced to make a settlement offer and pay 
public h d s  when in fact it had no legal obligation to pay any amount and Klure had no legal 
right to recover. Such a result was never contemplated by Acarrequi or its progeny, and Klure's 
request should be denied. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Klure's appeal in this case should be denied and the decision of the District Court 
affirmed. Klure had no property interest at the time of the alleged taking and ACHD did not take 
or condemn any property. Dr. Curtis sold his property to ACHD at his own request, and after 
arms-length negotiations resulting in a sale at fair market value. Dr. Curtis sold the property 
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after Klure's lease had expired, after Klure's holdover tenancy had ended with his voluntary 
departure from the property, after Klure's business had been relocated, and after the partnership 
had dissolved. Based on the undisputed facts and the authority cited, Klure's appeal in this 
matter should be denied, and the decision of the District Court affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of January, 2010. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
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